beginning of wisdom*, (c) The cultivation or development here means that the feelings should be expanded or enlarged to other areas by means of education. Men may indeed become very different from one another in regard to virtues, but it is because they did not "carry out fully their natural powers", 6 not because they were originally born with different degrees of innate feelings. In this sense it may be said that virtues "are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them.** 7 Mencius thus says that if we expand "what we cannot bear" (feeling of sympathy-commiseration) to the area of "what we can bear," then there will be the virtue of humanity. If we expand "what we will not do" (feeling of shame-dislike) to the area of "what we will do", then there will be the virtue of righteousness 1 . All in all, the argument is based on the belief that such innate feelings are essential constituents of human nature and that they can be expanded to the realm of morality by means of education. This means that morality can be derived from the development of human nature itself, not from, say, God's commandments or other external inducements.
Mencius' second argument, which I will call a "higher-principle" argument, is stated in the Book of Mencius, 6 A: 16 :3 : Some pans of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man... Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men ... Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him ... There is a nobility of Heaven, and there is a nobility of man ... The men of antiquity cultivated their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came to them in its train. The men of the present day cultivate their nobility of Heaven in order to seek for the nobility of man, and when they have obtained that, they throw away the other; -their delusion is extreme. The issue is simply this, that they must lose that nobility of man as well.
This argument starts with the principle of relative importance that we should pay our attention to different parts of our body according to their relative importance. For example, he who takes good care of his fingers and neglects his shoulders and back is a fool. He who nourishes the small parts will become a small man; and he who nourishes the great part will become a great man. Mencius then argues that man consists of small parts (emotional elements) and great parts (rational elements) 9 . The emotional elements embody what may be called a lower principle, or, in Mencius' own words, a nobility of man, in that, if not properly controlled by the latter, they may lead to evil. The-rational 5 In this article I use the words "seed" and "beginning" interchangeably, although, strictly speaking, they may be different from one another. . 6 Book of Mencius, 6 A: 6:7. 7 Ibid., 6A:6:7. 1 /*«/., 7B:31:1. 9 As I will explain in the following, the word "emotion" here is used in a wide sense, including the four innate feelings as well as other desires for wealth, food and sex.
elements embody what may be called a higher principle or a nobility of Heaven, in that their main function is to limit the gratification of emotion, so to speak 10 . But this does not mean that man's emotional elements should be suppressed or oppressed by the rational elements. This is both impossible and undesirable. As explained in the psychological argument, there are within emotional elements those four kinds of natural and moral feelings as well as other desires for wealth, food, sex and so forth. Moreover, these desires are neutral in the sense that, while they are not the beginnings of good for themselves, they need not be obstacles to the development of the four potentially good feelings. This was well expressed in Mencius' reply to King Hsuan of Ch'i: "If your Majesty love wealth, let your people enjoy the same ... If your Majesty love sex, let your people enjoy the same, and what difficulty will there be for you to become the true king of the empire? 11 " On the contrary, man's emotional elements, if properly guided, may become, in Creel's words, "the surest guarantors of moral conduct."
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On the other hand, Mencius was well aware that man's emotional nature does not always become "the surest guarantors of moral conduct" because of evil external influences such as unqualified teachers, inhumane governments, corrupt societies and so forth. It can easily be frustrated or overpowered by evil circumstances. Fortunately, man has, Mencius continues, a rational nature as well as an emotional nature; and whenever he is in danger of being defeated by evil powers, he wants to, and tries to, follow a higher principle inherent.in his rational nature. What man should do therefore is to let this higher principle prevail, control, govern, regulate or direct the lower principle inherent in his emotional nature. For the neglect of the higher principle will inevitably lead to the "loss" of the lower. The ancient sages, for example, diligently cultivated the nobler part or a nobility of Heaven, and the inferior part "naturally followed."
13 Today people are concerned with the cultivation of the nobility of Heaven, Mencius exclaims, only to seek the nobility of man; and once they achieve some degree of this, they immediately throw away the other and so surely lose the nobility of man as well If we build up the nobler part of our nature, the inferior part can never take it away.
Mencius thus believes that there is a difference rather than an inherent opposition between emotion and reason. Men's emotional nature is but a lower principle of morality, but it is still a principle we cannot and should not do away with 
II. A General Examination of Mencius' Arguments
Here I will make only a few general remarks on the question whether Mencius has proved his thesis that man is originally good; a more thorough examination will be made in the final section, where I will compare Mencius* arguments with those of Kant.
The psychological argument is based on our de facto feelings, and so has some psychological appeal. But it obviously falls short of showing that there are sufficient grounds to accept his thesis rather than other theories of human nature, (a) It is not clear at all whether man is born with originally good seeds, evil seeds, both of them, or neither of them. Our daily experience seems to substantiate a "middle position", i. e., that man is neither good nor evil, or that man is good as much as evil, or that man is partly good and partly evil, (b) Mencius offers no deductive or inductive support for his thesis. He simply speculates on human nature on the basis of his own subjective opinion. It must be noted that his reasoning is neither deductive nor inductive, and, as a result, his argument, if it is an argument at all, is purely an arbitrary one 16 . Richards comments on this point:
... it is no part of Mencius' purpose to analyse, justify or discuss them [four feelings and four virtues] in general. The casuistry of them, the discussion of particular examples, is a main part of his work and all psychological argumentation may be regarded as an apology to enforce them ... Since all men know them and accept them, his task is only to encourage men's energies to flow into their development 17 .
(c) Mencius observes several human acts which are closely related to the feelings of sympathy-commiseration and of shame-dislike, and then generalizes that all men have these feelings. But this is a case of "hasty generalization." Moreover, even if we suppose that we know the general nature of man, good or evil, this knowledge is so general-that it can give us no insight into determining why a particular person, Dick or Jane, ought to act freely in a certain way. In short, Mencius cannot avoid the charge of hasty generalization, and even if we accept his generalization, he cannot avoid the charge of "hasty particularization." The higher-principle also fails because it is based on an unwarranted assumption that man has two different principles, (a) It is unwarranted because Mencius does not even endeavor to prove that there are such principles. Moreover, even if we accept such principles, it does not follow that all human action is solely controlled by them. Besides or over such principles, there may very well be other principles, such as survival, teleology, purposiveness, or whatever, (b) Mencius* characterization of man as having both an emotional and a rational nature is undoubtedly dualistic, and this dualism seems to undermine the validity of his universal characterization of human nature as entirely good, (c) Mencius does not downgrade man's emotional nature as something diametrically opposed to morality. To be sure, it is something less than a higher principle, but, as I mentioned before, it is still a principle to guide man's action. This means that, since man can follow either of the two principles, Mencius must show exactly why man should freely follow a higher principle rather than a lower principle. It is not enough to say that there are two different principles; Mencius still must prove that, as far as morality is concerned, the world governed by a higher principle does or should control the world governed by a lower principle 18 , and that man ought to live as a member of the former world, despite the fapt that he can also live as a member of the latter 19 .
III. Kant's Arguments
In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant wants to show that a categorical imperative is a universal and necessary moral principle, and, for this purpose, he offers two different kinds of arguments. He starts with an assumption that our ordinary moral discourse is meaningful and, in addition, that our ordinary moral judgments are usually true. He then asks what are the conditions that must hold if this claim is to be justified, and this is what he calls an "analytical argument." By addressing those who share his basic moral convictions about what is right and what is wrong, in the first chapter of the Foundations Kant attempts to lead us, by an analytical argument, from our ordinary moral judgments to a philosophical statement of the first principle of morality, namely, a categorical imperative. By addressing those who grant the meaningfulness of our ordinary moral discourse but may embrace principles other than a categorical imperative, in the second chapter of the Foundations Kants attempts to formulate, still by an analytical argument, the imperative in many different ways. In the 18 If we define morality by the idea of predominance of a "higher principle," this objection does not hold. But Mencius' ethics is not definitional. -19 Mencius' analogy of water, mentioned in the Book of Mencius, 6 A :2:2-3, makes fairly good sense. He says that man's original nature is good, just as water always flows downward, although it can become evil in the same way that water can be forced to flow upward by some artificial means. But an analogy is not a proof. It is but a figure understood only within its contexts. Moreover, the same analogy can successfully be used to show, for example, that human nature is originally evil.
third and final chapter of the Foundations Kant attempts to derive the supreme moral principle from pure practical reason itself, and this is what he calls a "synthetical argument. "* The analytical arguments roughly run as follows: According to Kant, nothing in the world is absolutely good except a good will; a good will alone is good without qualification. All "gifts of nature" or "gifts of fortune" are also good, but "without the principle of a good will they can become extremely bad." 21 In addition, a good will is good, not for what it accomplishes, but for what it intends. Even if it could not achieve anything, it would still "sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself." 22 In short, it is good "only because of its willing, L e., it is good in itself." 23 And this good will "dwells in the natural sound understanding" of all rational beings 24 .
The concept of a good will, Kant continues, is "contained" in the concept of duty. And the analysis of the concept of duty shows that actions are morally worthy (a) if they are done from a sense of duty, not from inclination, and/or (b) if they are done not only in accordance with duty but for the sake of duty. But to act for the sake of duty is to act out of respect for the laws. That is, the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it, but rather in the following the law itself. And this law, which can "determine the will without reference to the expected result 25 " and thus demand a universal conformity of all actions, takes the following form: "Would I be content that my maxim should hold as a universal law for myself as well as for others?" or "Can I will that my maxim become a universal law? 26 " At any rate, the important point here is that we cannot draw this universal law by generalizing some examples of moral actions given to us in experience. Moreover, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all. It follows that "all moral concepts have their seat and origin entirely a priori in reason." 27 Now to show that a categorical imperative is possible (justified), says Kant, we have to show that the principle on which it commands is valid and binding for all rational beings. The imperative of skill and prudence presents no problem, for it involves an analytic proposition, i. e., that any rational agent who wills an end necessarily wills the 20 The words "analytical argument" and "synthetical argument" should not be confused-with "analytic judgment" and "synthetic judgment." According to Kant, an analytical argument is done by a mere analysis of the concepts contained in the argument; a synthetical argument is done by a critical examination of pure practical reason itself. For this difference I use the words "analytical" and "synthetical" rather than "analytic" and "synthetic" in this article. means to that end as well. But the imperative of morality (categorical imperative) cannot be justified in this way, for, as we have already seen, "we cannot show with certainty by any example that the will is here determined by the law alone without any other incentives."* In order to. justify it we have to show that man as a rational agent would necessarily and freely act in a certain way, and this cannot be done by an analytical argument.
Kant's synthetical argument roughly runs as follows: All rational beings have a will, and a will can act in two different ways. It can act without being forced by something other than itself, namely, by a law of freedom, or it can act, as in the case of irrational beings, only so far as it is forced by something other than itself, namely, by a law of necessity, Now since the law of freedom must be self-imposed, not other-imposed, freedom is identical with autonomy. And since autonomy is the principle of morality, as Kant has already proved in the previous chapters of the Foundations, a free will is a will'under moral laws.
But here arises a problem of "vicious circle". We argue that one must suppose himself free because he is under moral laws, and then argue that one must be under moral laws because he has supposed that he is free. The solution of this problem lies in the "doctrine of two standpoints" which was explicated in the Critique of Pure Reason. To be brief, we must suppose that man belongs to two different worlds; a sensible world which is given to senses and an intelligible world which can be conveiced but can never be known. When man regards himself as belonging exclusively to the sensible world, he is completely subject to the law of cause and effect. But when he regards himself as belonging exclusively to the intelligible world, he is subject to the laws which "have their grounds in reason alone" and his actions are entirely free.
But the concept of freedom, without which there can be no moral judgments, is, Kant continues, only an "idea of reason" whose "objective reality in itself is doubtful" in the sense that it always produces "unconditional concepts which go beyond sense and can have no empirical example." 29 This means that there can be no full explanation of the concept of freedom, and this, in turn, means that there can be no full explanation of morality either.
IV. A Comparative Study of Mencius and Kant
In order to show the invalidity of Mencius' theory of human nature, in this final section I will make reference to Kant's efforts to justify his own "science of morality." Kant talks relatively little about human nature, except in one chapter of the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. So it seems safe to conclude that he does not advocate any theory of human nature 30 . In fact, he says that we cannot sensibly discuss human nature as such, for such a discussion cannot be fully based on experience 51 . All we can talk about is human "predispositions" toward good and human "propensities" toward evil Nevertheless, our reference to Kant will be very useful for the following reasons. In the Foundations Kant tries to justify the universality and necessity of a categorical imperative, in a way similar to that in which Mencius tries to justify the universality of this theory of human nature. In other words, it will be useful, not because their arguments have many similarities, but mainly because they have the same logical form or structure, although what both philosophers want to prove are very different from one another. Kant's efforts to provide an apodictic justification for a categorical imperative will therefore shed some light on our understanding exactly what Mencius' arguments are, in what manner they are offered, and on what assumptions, if any, they are based.
I will thus compare Mencius' psychological argument with Kant's analytical arguments, and this will show that Mencius' theory of human nature, which claims to be universal, must be justified, if at all, by some nonempirical arguments. I will then compare Mencius' higher-principle argument with Kant's synthetical argument and hope to show that Mencius has failed to provide the justification for the universality of this theory of human nature, in the same way that Kant has failed. Of course, Kant's failure itself does not prove Mencius' failure, but it will show that there are sufficient grounds to conclude that Mencius' arguments are doomed to failure.
In the first chapter of the Foundations Kant draws, solely from our ordinary moral judgments, the concept of duty and of a universal law whose from is a categorical imperative. But in the second chapter he insists this does not mean that we can derive the concept of duty and of a categorical imperative by generalizing examples of moral action given to us in experience. Morality can never be based on empirical examples for the following several reasons, (a) Morality is not a matter of blind imitation; the most such examples can do is to encourage us to act dutifully, (b) It is because we already possess a moral principle that we can judge an action to be an example of moral action, and not the other way around, (c) Most of all, "no experience can give occasion for inferring the possibility of such apodictic laws 32 " because everything in experiences is contingent or conditioned, not necessary or unconditioned 33 . But morality must be 30 One might argue that the "rational human being" to whom Kant's ethics is addressed is a kind of characterization of human nature. But I say Kant does not advocate any theory of human nature simply because he does not base his discussion of man on the goodness or evil of human nature, as it has been done in the history of Chinese philosophy. 31 Kant in fact talks a lot about a priori elements involved in experience. The point here is that any theory of human nature, if it is to be valid, must be based on a priori inferences rather than on inductive inferences. 32 Strictly speaking, the demonstration of the possibility of an absolute moral law is, according to Kant, necessary "only for its explanation and not for its establishment" (Ak 420). So the word "possibility" here should be taken as "justification." 33 Kant, Foundations, Ak 408. valid with absolute necessity; it must not be merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions. Kant states:
It cannot be shown by any example (i. e., it cannot be empirically shown) whether or not there is such imperative; it is rather to be suspected that all imperatives which appear to be categorical may yet be hypothetical, but in a hidden way 34 .
What is worse, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all. For we cannot tell with certainty whether an action is done according to a will that is determined "by the law alone without any other incentives/'
35 This means that we must derive the supreme moral principle, if it is possible at all, from pure practical reason itself; we must go beyond experience "to a critical examination of the subject, i. e., of the pure practical reason."
36 But such an examination brings up the question of synthetic a priori concepts, says Kant, and this will be done by a synthetical argument in the third and final chapter of the Foundations.
Now we are in a position to appreciate more fully the significance of Kant's analytical arguments for Mencius' psychological argument. If Kant is correct, this sort of empirical appeal will never provide a justification for Mencius' universal statement that all men without exception are originally good. Mencius' argument will not establish what it purports to establish, not only because, as I mentioned before, it commits the fallacy of hasty generalization and hasty particularization, but, more fundamentally, because no contingent empirical examples can provide a justification for universal statement such as Mencius' theory. Moreover, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all because we cannot tell with certainty whether an act of commiseration, for example, is done out of the agent's original good nature, or out of other "incentives," or out of both.
To repeat, Mencius' psychological argument fails because all empirical examples are contingent and are thus unable to prove or disprove any necessary and unconditional statements. This is why Mencius' theory of human nature, which claims to be universal, must be justified, if at all, by some nonempirical arguments, and this is exactly what Mencius is attempting to do in his nonempirical higher-principle argument.
Kant's synthetical argument starts with a definition of a will and quickly involves the concept of freedom because he believes that we must presuppose freedom in order to have morality in the first place. But there is a conflict or contradiction between freedom and necessity. We can abandon neither of them in favor of the other. This conflict can be resolved only if man conceives himself both as a member of a sensible world and an intelligible world. As a member of the former world he is completely subject to the law of necessity, but as a member of the latter he is completely free. Kant states:
The moral worth is therefore his own volition as a member of the intelligible world, and it is conceived by him as an ought only in so far as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense 3 '.
Kant's synthetical argument is not convincing, (a) The argument heavily depends on some crucial points which Kant believes he has already proved in the previous analytical arguments, and this does not square with his own declaration that the "real* justification for a categorial imperative must.be made by synthetical argument, (b) Kant's twoworld view is very difficult to accept. It is indeed amazing to see that, for Kant, the conflict between freedom and natural determinism and the explanation of how a rule of autonomous reason appears to men as an imperative are only the corollaries of his distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. (c) Even if we accept his two-world view, we must further assume that the intelligible world "contains" the ground of the sensible world and also of its laws, because Kant infers from this assumption that the laws governing one's will as a member of an intelligible world ought to govern his will as a member of a sensible world. But there is no reason why we should grant, at least without further explanations, the primacy of a noumenal self over a phenomenal self, (d) On Kant's own argument, we can have no knowledge of the intelligible world, for we have no acquaintance with such a world by means of experience. We have only an idea of it, and that is all. This means, as Kant himself admits, that our idea of freedom, which is derived from the idea of an intelligible world, cannot be adequately explained, and this, in turn, means that we only have a "form" of an intelligible world, i, e., the principle of autonomy and its corresponding concept (a categorical imperative) 38 . Kant has indeed left his readers the impression that his synthetical argument would go beyond what has been said in his previous analytical arguments and provide, once and for all, an apodictic justification for a categorical imperative. But he concludes the Foundations with an apology for "the extreme limit of all moral enquiry" rather with a note of triumph: "We cannot prove freedom to be real in ourselves and in human nature." 39 We cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of a moral imperative; all we can comprehend is its incomprehensibility 40 . 37 Ibid., Ak 455. 38 We can also explain Kant's failure in terms of his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to Kant, the connection between subject and predicate terms in all synthetic judgments require a "third thing" by which the two terms can be united. In the case of empirical synthetic judgments, our experience serves as the third thing. But the matter is not so simple with a priori synthetic judgments, for we cannot justify them by appealing to experience. Kant thus concludes in the Critique of Pure Reason that "the conditions of a possible experience in general" serves as the third thing for all synthetic a priori judgments. In a similar but arbitrary way, Kant concludes in the Foundations that the principle of autonomy and its corresponding categorical imperative are also synthetic a priori and that the third thing in this case is "the positive concept of freedom." But it turns out that this concept in which the categorical imperative is grounded is nothing but an assertion that man experiences himself both as a conditioned appearance and as an unconditioned noumenon. 39 Kant, Foundations, Ak 447. What is the bearing of our evaluation of Kant's synthetical argument on Mencius? Let me first point out that Mencius' and Kant's arguments have the same logical form or structure 41 . From the previous arguments (i. e., Kant's analytical argument and Mencius' psychological argument) it follows that no justification (i. e., an apodictic justification of morality for Kant and a complete justification of universal statement for Mencius) is possible by empirical examples. So the justification must be made by some nonempirical arguments. This is why both philosophers make an appeal to anonempirical thing, namely, an intelligible world and a higher principle, respectively. According to Kant, man is a member of both worlds, but he ought to act as a member of an intelligible world. According to Mencius, man is a follower of both principles, but he ought to follow a higher principle.
But if my evaluation of Kant's synthetical argument (and Kant's own confession) is correct, the very logical form of his argument has at least one counter-example, namely, his own argument, and thus the form is invalid. For it is sufficient to find one counterexample in order to prove that a form is invalid. It follows that Mencius' higherprinciple argument is not valid by virtue of that form 42 , and that we shall have to find another form it possesses if we are to show it to be a valid argument.
Mencius does not offer an elaborate argument as does Kant, but if he were pressed to do so, I think he would have come out with something like Kant's argument. Like Kant, Mencius also presupposes the existence of freedom. This is clear by the fact that we can indeed make no sense of his discussion of two different principles if we assume we cannot choose either of them freely. But Mencius' attempt to resolve a conflict between freedom and necessity, which he could have made but unfortunately did not, will ultimately be a failure in the same way that Kant fails, (a) A moral skeptic, who believes that there is no good reason to praise or blame other people morally, would not accept that man has within himself two different principles, (b) Unlike Kant, Mencius does not even offer a full explanation why it is the case that there are two different principles in all human beings. He simply takes it for granted, (c) Even if he were to offer an explanation along the lines of Kant's synthetical argument, he could not have provided a justification for his theory of human nature, without assuming some prior 41 There are many differences as well as similarities between Kant and Mencius. In fact, most words such as "universal" or "free" used by both philosophers do not have the same meaning. Moreover, as I already mentioned, what they want to prove are very different from one another. But these differences will not affect my discussion, for in the following I will discuss the form of their arguments, not the arguments themselves. When we deal with the form of arguments, we do not have to care about the particular characteristics of the classes referred to by the terms contained in arguments. We can even substitute letters for each of the term, using the same letter to replace the same term each time it occurs and different letters to replace different terms. 42 I use the phrase "not valid by virtue of this form* because the method of counter-example "conclusively proves the invalidity of a form, but not necessarily that of particular argument... If we merely show that an argument has a certain form, and that this form is invalid, we have not thereby proved that the argument is invalid. In order to establish conclusively the invalidity of an argument, it is necessary to show that there is no other form which it possesses by virtue of which it is valid." Wesley C. Salmon, Logic, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 21. metaphysical presuppositions like Kant's two-world view, and these presuppositions would be something very hard to swallow for "nonbelievers". (d) Finally, even if we accept his two-principle view, Mencius is further obliged to explain why we should follow freely a higher principle rather than a lower principle, just as Kant is obliged to explain why we should live as a member of a noumenal world rather than as a member of a phenomenal world. For, as opposed to Mencius' contention, one may very well say that emotion is a higher principle and reason a lower principle 43 . Most theories of human nature, whether that nature be good, evil, or neutral, boast of a universality that allows no exceptions. Mencius' theory of human nature is not an exception to this claim. But if my discussion of Mencius is correct, the universality claimed by his theory is not justified on his two arguments discussed in this article 44 . 43 This is why I argued elsewhere that Confucius was radically different from Mencius. See Philip Ho Hwang, A New Interpretation of Confucius, Philosophy East and West, 30, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 45-55. 44 Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that Mencius' theory of human nature might be justified on other reasons.
